Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling
构建了一个公开市场回购的信号模型，分析回购对内部人效用的影响，并用700多个美国回购案例验证了三个推论：回购越多、风险越高、内部人持股越多，企业未来盈利越高。
This paper presents a signaling model of open market repurchases that simulates the effects of a repurchase on the insiders' utility. If insiders refrain from tendering, then they are exposed to more risk. If insiders are risk averse, then the market can draw several inferences regarding the insiders' expectations of their firm's future earnings: 1) firms that repurchase more have higher earnings; 2) holding the repurchase proportion constant, riskier firms have higher earnings; and 3) holding proportion constant, firms where insiders have a greater ownership stake have higher earnings. I test the model's implications with a sample of over 700 US repurchases and find support for all three.