Worker surveillance capital, labour share, and productivity
建立了一个包含生产资本和监控资本两类资本的模型，分析监控资本如何通过影响工人压力与激励，导致劳动份额下降和生产率放缓。
Abstract This paper proposes a basic model with two types of capital: productive capital directly involved in the production process and capital devoted to monitoring workers. Surveillance capital intensifies workers’ job strain, while wage recognition encourages their engagement. Firms face a double trade-off between the two types of capital, and between incentives and labour costs. Under simple assumptions, up to a certain threshold, technological innovation improves productivity, wages, and profits at the same pace, leading to a flat labour share in income. Then, once the threshold is breached, profit-maximization initiates a transfer from productive capital to monitoring tools. This progressive shift generates a decline in the labour share and a productivity slowdown, despite greater job strain. The model suggests the possibility of a third phase in which productivity recovers.