Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Taking
研究投资组合经理持有自己管理的基金份额（即“利益捆绑”）如何影响共同基金的风险承担行为，发现经理持股能降低年内和跨年的风险调整活动，尤其对代理问题严重的经理效果更明显，对基金投资者有重要启示。
This paper studies the effect of portfolio manager ownership (i.e., “skin in the game”) on mutual fund risk taking. Using holdings-based risk change measures that capture managers’ ex ante risk choices, we find that portfolio manager ownership reduces both intrayear and across-year risk-taking activities. The relationship between ownership and risk reduction is particularly strong among managers with high agency issue–induced risk-taking incentives—for example, managers who face a more convex flow-performance relationship, have poor past performance, or are not compensated based on long-term fund performance. Funds with greater managerial ownership are also associated with lower levels of total risk and downside risk. Overall, portfolio manager ownership serves as an incentive alignment mechanism and has important implications for mutual fund investors. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.