A Road Map for Efficiently Taxing Heterogeneous Agents
在一个包含异质性双成员家庭的生命周期模型中，刻画了依赖于年龄、家庭资产和申报状态的最优劳动所得税，发现税收扭曲在年龄上呈驼峰形、随资产递减，且联合申报者低于单身申报者，使用所有三个标签的税制可将消费提高6.4%、福利提高1.5%。
This paper characterizes optimal labor income taxes that depend on age, household assets, and filing status (one or two earners) within a life-cycle model with heterogeneous, two-member households. The key innovation is a labor supply elasticity that varies endogenously among households. I find that tax distortions should be hump shaped in age, decrease in household assets, and be lower for joint relative to single filers. Age and assets act as complements within the optimal tax policy. Overall, a tax system using all three tags can increase consumption up to 6.4 percent and welfare up to 1.5 percent.