Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?
比较了美国大型银行控股公司的政府监管机构与市场参与者（债券评级机构和股票市场）在评估银行状况时的及时性和准确性，发现监管机构与债券评级机构各有对方不知的信息，但监管评估整体准确性低于市场评估。
We compare the timeliness and accuracy of government supervisors versus market participants in assessing the condition of large U.S. bank holding companies. We find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both have some prior information that is useful to the other. In contrast, supervisory assessments and equity market indicators are not strongly interrelated. We also find that supervisory assessments are much less accurate overall than both bond and equity market assessments in predicting future changes in performance, but supervisors may be more accurate when inspections are recent. To some extent, these results may reflect differing incentives of the parties. We compare the timeliness and accuracy of government supervisors versus market participants in assessing the condition of large U.S. bank holding companies. We find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both have some prior information that is useful to the other. In contrast, supervisory assessments and equity market indicators are not strongly interrelated. We also find that supervisory assessments are much less accurate overall than both bond and equity market assessments in predicting future changes in performance, but supervisors may be more accurate when inspections are recent. To some extent, these results may reflect differing incentives of the parties.