CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
研究发现，Chhaochharia和Grindstein估计的CEO薪酬下降幅度中74%由两个异常值驱动；且薪酬委员会独立性要求反而提高了CEO总薪酬，尤其在股东监督有效时。
ABSTRACT Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.