Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities
研究网络中的非合作双边谈判博弈，证明存在均衡产生合作谈判的剩余分配，该分配与Myerson-Shapley值相关，并应用于买方-卖方网络和纵向排他分析。
This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the M yerson‐ S hapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.