Is Murder Bad for Business? Evidence from Colombia
利用哥伦比亚总统乌里韦任期内安全支出增加导致的暴力减少，研究暴力犯罪对企业市场价格和规模的影响，发现高暴力地区企业面临更低的产出和投入价格，产出价格下降更多，导致企业减产甚至退出市场，工人实际收入减少。
Abstract This paper studies the effects of violent crime on market prices and size using plant-level panel data in Colombia. To estimate causal effects, I exploit reductions in violence driven by increases in security expenditures during Álvaro Uribe’s presidency; these resulted in greater violence reductions in municipalities that voted for him in the 2002 elections as he was looking for reelection. I find that firms that face higher violence also face lower output and input prices. Output prices fall more than the prices of inputs, which drives firms to reduce production, and some firms exit the market. Workers see reductions in their real income.