A Servant to Many Masters: Competing Shareholder Preferences and Limits to Catering
研究企业如何通过股利政策迎合股东偏好，发现迎合受市场分割和偏好分散限制，但能提升企业价值，且迎合能力强的企业公告股权融资和股利时市场反应更积极。
Abstract We study what determines catering through the payout policy and how catering affects firm value. We create a catering index, measuring how the firm caters to its investors’ payout preferences. The index is based on the revealed payout preferences of mutual funds holding the firm’s stocks. Catering is constrained by market segmentation and dispersion in investor payout preferences. It is also associated with positive value effects: Firms increasing their catering index also experience an increase in value. Furthermore, greater catering ability is associated with a more positive market reaction to corporate announcements of equity issues and dividend payouts.