Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance
提出风险规避工人的税后保留工资可反映其福利，据此设计检验失业保险最优性的新方法，利用保留工资对失业救济金的反应程度进行判断。现有估算表明美国提高失业救济金有显著收益，但需更多研究保留工资的决定因素。
This paper argues that a risk-averse worker's after-tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information about her welfare. This insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance based on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment benefits. Some existing estimates imply significant gains to raising the current level of unemployment benefits in the United States but highlight the need for more research on the determinants of reservation wages. Our approach complements those based on Baily's [Journal of Public Economics, X (1978), 379–402] test.