Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered
研究发现，当学生偏好相同且学校无优先级时，波士顿机制在事前福利上优于Gale-Shapley延迟接受算法，且可能帮助不擅长策略的参与者，在存在学校优先级时也倾向于让无优先级的学生获得更多好学校机会。
Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools.