Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance
研究了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案如何改变公司治理与绩效的关系，发现董事会独立性与经营绩效在法案前后由负相关转为正相关，并提出以董事持股金额作为更简单直观的治理衡量指标。
Abstract We study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. We consider 5 measures of corporate governance during the period 1998–2007. We find a significant negative relationship between board independence and operating performance during the pre-2002 period, but a positive and significant relationship during the post-2002 period. Our most important contribution is a proposal of a governance measure, namely, dollar ownership of the board members, that is simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index.