Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry
研究了在参与者随机进入的Tullock竞赛中，如何设计信息披露政策来激励参与者，发现无披露与完全披露的优劣取决于进入概率对预期总努力的平衡效应。
Abstract We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.