Housing, Health, and Annuities
研究发现，如果老年人通常在生病或高龄时才出售住房，那么长期护理保险和年金会变得不那么有吸引力，甚至可能相互替代，因为出售住房会降低财富的边际效用。
Abstract Annuities, long‐term care insurance (LTCI), and reverse mortgages appear to offer important consumption smoothing benefits to the elderly, yet private markets for these products are small. A prominent idea is to combine LTCI and annuities to alleviate both supply (selection) and demand (liquidity) problems in these markets. This article shows that if consumers typically liquidate home equity only in the event of illness or very old age, then LTCI and annuities become less attractive and may become substitutes rather than complements. The reason is that the marginal utility of wealth drops when an otherwise illiquid home is sold, an event correlated with the payouts of both annuities and LTCI. Simulations confirm that demand for LTCI and annuities is highly sensitive to the liquidity and magnitude of home equity.