You Owe Me
实验发现，即使人们明知送礼者意图，小礼物仍会强烈影响其行为，挑战现有社会偏好模型，并指出礼物会创造回馈义务，常见政策如披露和限额可能无效，而金钱激励有效但可能适得其反。
In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.