Influential Opinion Leaders
研究了一个两阶段协调博弈，早期有特殊利益的专家被后期追随者观察，结果均衡偏向专家利益，即使追随者知道专家利益分布。专家影响完全分散，偏差源于社会学习效应被协调动机放大。适用于社会运动兴起和网络外部性产品扩散。
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special \ninterests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium \noutcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of \nexpert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert \nhas a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is \nmultiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements \nand to the diffusion of products with network externalities.