AFFILIATED AGENTS, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, AND MUTUAL FUND SECURITIES LENDING RETURNS
研究发现，使用赞助商关联借贷代理的美国指数基金，其证券年化借贷收益较低；而基金自行管理借贷项目时收益显著更高。董事会多重任职、董事基金持股多、独立性强、超额薪酬低与更高借贷收益相关。
Abstract Using a manually collected U.S. index mutual fund sample, we find that funds with sponsor‐affiliated lending agents have lower annual returns on lent securities and that securities lending returns are significantly higher when funds administer their own lending programs. We also document that multiple board of director appointments, more director fund ownership, higher board independence, and lower excess director compensation are associated with higher lending returns. Overall, the evidence has implications for mutual fund boards as they consider lending proposals and for future regulatory actions.