The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining
研究独立商店合并成大店的经济动机，发现当商店对生产商的初始议价能力高时不会形成大店，否则在偏好一站式购物的消费者多时会出现一家大店。
We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.