The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week
利用垄断工会和有效谈判模型分析缩短标准工作周对就业的影响，发现效果不确定且常为负面，并探讨工会为何仍推动缩短工时。
Labor organizations currently argue that reducing the standard working week will help lower the high unemployment of the 1980s. Opponents maintai n that this will increase labor costs, and therefore not alleviate un employment. This paper analyzes the employment effects of a cut in ho urs, using the monopoly union and efficient bargaining models of the union and firm. Under various developments of the models, the results are quite consistent: a reduction in hours has employment effects th at are at best ambiguous and very often negative. A puzzle remains as to why trade unions are pressing for shorter hours. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.