Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns
研究共同基金投资私有风险企业时的合同条款，发现资金更稳定的基金更倾向投资私有企业，且参与轮次有更强赎回和IPO相关权利、更少董事会席位。
Abstract “Founder-friendly” venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.