Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions
研究对冲基金股东积极主义对被目标公司银行贷款利差的影响，发现不同类型的积极行动对债务成本有不同效应，且公司治理弱时影响更显著。
We investigate the effect of shareholder activism on debtholders by examining a sample of bank loans for firms targeted by activist hedge funds. We compare loan spreads before and after intervention and show the effects of heterogeneous shareholder actions. Spreads increase when shareholder activism relies on the market for corporate control or financial restructuring. In contrast, spreads decrease when activists address managerial entrenchment. Furthermore, the effects are more pronounced when pre-existing governance mechanisms are weak. Our findings suggest that shareholder activism does not necessarily exacerbate bondholder-shareholder conflicts of interest and highlight the role of activism in aligning investors.