CEO Compensation and Board Structure
利用2001-2002年美国公司丑闻后交易所出台的董事会新规，发现受新规影响更大的公司CEO薪酬显著下降，尤其在无外部大股东或机构投资者持股分散的公司中更明显。
ABSTRACT In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time‐varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.