Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures
研究了共同基金的团队管理与单人管理对经理能力、基金业绩和投资组合的影响，发现团队管理基金表现更好且更保守，但高能力经理倾向于选择单人管理，控制自选择后差异更明显。
We model and test the relations between the team management of mutual funds, managers’ ability, performance, and holdings. Our model predicts that team-managed funds perform better and behave more conservatively than single-manager funds. However, the effect of team management is masked in equilibrium because high-ability managers rationally self-select into single-manager funds. Consistent with the model’s prediction, we find that team-managed funds perform better and deviate less from their benchmark allocations than single-manager funds with the same characteristics. These differences are marked after we control for the endogenous self-selection of managers.