Can Rationing Increase Welfare? Theory and an Application to India’s Ration Shop System
研究了发展中国家为何使用配给店体系，发现存在公平与效率的权衡：追求效率的政府不会用，但追求福利的政府可能用它来再分配和提供保险。对印度校准后发现，配给店对四种商品中的三种有福利改进作用。
In many developing countries, households can purchase limited quantities of goods at a fixed subsidized price through ration shops. This paper asks whether the characteristics of developing countries explain why governments use such systems. I find an equity-efficiency trade-off: an efficiency-maximizing government will never use ration shops, but a welfare-maximizing one might to redistribute and provide insurance. Welfare gains of ration shops will be highest for necessity goods and goods with high price risk. I calibrate the model for India and find that ration shops are welfare improving for three of the four goods sold through the system today.