The Effect of Labor Market Demand on U.S. CEO Pay Since 1980
研究发现，1980至2003年间美国大型企业CEO薪酬超过600%的增长中，最多只有33%可由劳动力市场竞争（以大型企业规模衡量）解释，其余增长源于其他因素。
Abstract This paper shows that the rise in U.S. chief executive officer (CEO) pay from 1980 to 2003 is only partially explained by competition for profit‐producing talent in the labor market. This conclusion is obtained by removing unintended data biases from tests of the only theoretical model in the literature that relates labor market competition (measured by large firm size) to CEO pay level. When the biases are removed or minimized, no more than 33% of the 600+ percentage rise in large‐firm CEO pay since 1980 is explained by a corresponding increase in large firm size.