Inside Debt and Mergers and Acquisitions
实证研究CEO内部债务持有与并购的关系，发现内部债务越高，公司风险承担越低，且内部债务与并购公告债券异常回报正相关、与股票异常回报负相关。
Abstract I empirically investigate the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and find evidence consistent with the agency theory’s prediction of a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate risk taking. Further analysis shows that CEO inside debt holdings are positively correlated with M&A announcement abnormal bond returns and long-term operating performance, but negatively correlated with M&A announcement abnormal stock returns. Finally, I find evidence that acquirers restructure the postmerger composition of CEO compensation that mirrors their capital structure in order to alleviate incentives for wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders or vice versa.