Managerial Rents vs. Shareholder Value in Delegated Portfolio Management: The Case of Closed-End Funds
研究了封闭式基金行业中基金经理如何利用过往业绩和投资者预期来扩大管理资产规模和提高管理费，但业绩不佳时惩罚不足，且长期任职的经理表现更差，揭示了管理租金的存在和规模不经济现象。
We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perceptions about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perceptions are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level. Received December 2, 2013; accepted June 21, 2016 by Editor Laura Starks.