Do managers provide misleading earnings forecasts before stock repurchases?
质疑管理者在股票回购前通过发布过于负面的盈利预测来误导投资者低价卖出股票的观点，发现回购公司与匹配公司的预测误差无显著差异，且市场负面反应仅出现在董事会授权回购之后发布预测的子样本中。
Abstract We question previous evidence that managers mislead investors into selling their stock for artificially lowered prices by releasing overly negative earnings forecasts before stock repurchases. We rely on forecast errors (forecast minus actual earnings) and show that these are insignificantly different between repurchase and matching firms. Our tests are powerful at detecting small differences and yet, across multiple subsamples, we find no statistical difference in forecast errors of repurchase and matching firms. Prior evidence of managerial misleading relied on the negative stock market reaction to management forecasts. We show that this negative reaction is observed only in the subsample where board authorization of repurchase follows management forecast. When board authorization precedes forecast, market reaction to management forecasts for repurchase firms is somewhat higher than that for matching firms. Our evidence suggests that managers are not misleading but exploiting low market prices to the advantage of their long‐term shareholders.