Sunk Costs and Screening: Two‐Part Tariffs in Life Insurance
研究利用人寿保险回溯数据，通过两部定价筛选未来保单持有人的行为，发现低退保倾向的消费者会自我选择进入该定价结构，并存在沉没成本谬误。
Abstract We develop a model of insurance pricing under heterogeneous lapse rates with asymmetric information about lapse likelihood within the context of an optional two‐part tariff as a screening device for future policyholder behavior. We then test for consumer self‐selection using policy‐level data on life insurance backdating. We exploit randomness in the initial tariff size to separately identify the selection and sunk cost effects of backdating on lapse proclivity. We find that consumers who are less likely to lapse self‐select into the two‐part tariff pricing structure and we also document consumer behavior consistent with sunk cost fallacy.