The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies
研究了转型经济中经理人和政治家如何维持对国有资本的控制，提出资产剥离由企业潜在盈利能力和影响执法能力共同驱动，并用五个转型经济体的约950家企业数据验证了该理论。
During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure, and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm’s potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.