Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
研究了工人努力不可观测时，道德风险如何影响就业创造与破坏的周期波动，发现它主要提高繁荣期激励边际工人的成本，从而抑制离职率的反周期波动。
Abstract We study the cyclical dynamics of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable. The no‐shirking constraint may amplify fluctuations in hiring by making firms' surplus share procyclical, and may cause a burst of inefficient firing when a downturn begins. But quantitatively, it mainly raises the cost of motivating marginal workers in booms, since firms cannot commit to keep them in recessions, and thereby strongly damps the countercyclical fluctuations in the separation rate. This implies a robust Beveridge curve, but casts doubt on Ramey and Watson's (1997) “contractual fragility” mechanism and worsens Shimer's (2005a) “volatility puzzle”.