Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt
研究管理层持股结构对公司债券发行利差的影响，发现管理层持股与借贷成本正相关，且股票期权比持股对利差影响更大，表明债券持有人会利用高管激励结构中的信息来定价新债。
Abstract This article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.