A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment
构建了一个实物期权模型，分析衰退行业中收购如何影响企业关闭决策，发现敌意收购能实现最优关闭，而管理层收购和同等合并则导致关闭过晚。
ABSTRACT We present a real‐options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first‐best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by closing the firm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of underleveraged firms always close too late, although golden parachutes may accelerate closure. We analyze the effects of takeovers of under‐leveraged firms. Takeovers by raiders enforce first‐best closure. Hostile takeovers by other firms occur either at the first‐best closure point or too early . Closure in management buyouts and mergers of equals happens inefficiently late .