The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts
研究管理层在发布盈利预测时如何选择补充披露，发现坏消息预测总是有信息含量，而好消息预测只有附上可验证的前瞻性陈述才具有信息含量，这有助于投资者判断预测的可信度。
ABSTRACT We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative “soft talk” disclosures or verifiable forward‐looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with similar frequency for good and bad news forecasts but are more likely to supplement good news forecasts with verifiable forward‐looking statements. We examine the market response to these forecasts and find that bad news earnings forecasts are always informative but that good news forecasts are informative only when supplemented by verifiable forward‐looking statements, supporting our argument that these statements bolster the credibility of good news forecasts.