Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare
用一个信息不对称的政治经济学模型，比较了基于延伸责任给私人融资者的环保体系与基于激励监管的体系在社会福利上的优劣，考虑了成本、效率、公共资金社会成本、活动盈利性、损害水平和监管俘获偏差等因素。
Abstract. Using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information, we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior, inferior, or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees. We explicitly consider the following factors: the cost of care and its efficiency in reducing the probability of an environmental accident, the social cost of public funds, the net profitability of the risky activities, the level of damages, and the regulatory capture bias. We characterize in such a parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other.