Will I Get Paid? Employee Stock Options and Mergers and Acquisitions
研究了目标公司员工薪酬合同如何影响并购条款和结果，发现80%的并购交易中员工股票期权被取消且未替换，平均价值损失38.4%，员工损失越大合并收益越高。
Abstract We analyze how employee compensation contracts of target firms affect merger terms and outcomes. Using unique data from merger agreements, we document that in 80.0% of all merger and acquisition (M&A) deals, at least some of the target’s employee stock options (ESOs) are canceled by the acquirer and not replaced by new equity-based grants. Contract modifications reduce the value of ESOs by 38.4% in the average M&A deal. Further, the combined merger returns are larger when employees experience greater losses. Overall, our results indicate that the benefits of reducing the number of ESOs outweigh the potential negative effects on firm value.