Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents*
研究了由参赛者自己决定奖金分配的锦标赛，通过实验分析了奖金差距、不确定性、参赛者异质性与努力程度的关系，发现奖金差距大时不确定性低、异质性高，且异质性会激发努力。
Abstract In some tournaments, it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Union members bargain over wage distribution, and some firms allow self‐managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labor. We analyze, and test experimentally, a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty, heterogeneity, and effort. We find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real‐effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions.