Shaping Expectations and Coordinating Attention: The Unintended Consequences of FOMC Press Conferences
研究发现，美联储主席在部分FOMC公告后举行新闻发布会，导致投资者在无发布会日降低对重要决策的预期，且这些公告传递的价格相关信息减少；同时投资者更关注有发布会的公告，这种注意力协调可能降低社会福利。
In an effort to increase transparency, the chair of the Federal Reserve now holds a press conference (PC) following some, but not all, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. Evidence from financial markets shows that investors lower their expectations of important decisions on days without PCs and that these announcements convey less price-relevant information. Correspondingly, we show that investors pay more attention to upcoming announcements with PCs. This coordination of attention can reduce welfare in models of the social value of public information. Consistent with theories of investor attention, the market risk premium is larger on days with PCs.