When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia
研究提高印尼本地银行代理的财务激励水平和透明度对新产品客户获取的影响，发现高激励仅在客户不知情时有效，公开反而因传递负面信号而失效。
Abstract We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.