A MODEL OF COLLATERAL: ENDOGENIZING THE BORROWING CONSTRAINT
构建了一个简单均衡模型，内生解释抵押信贷的产生，为宏观模型中常用的借贷约束提供微观基础，并解释了支付谜题及不同资产作为抵押品的适用性差异。
Abstract This article presents a simple equilibrium model in which collateralized credit emerges endogenously. In a frictional world, where commitment is limited and agent's actions are not publicly observable, we show that collateral can serve as a credible device that prevents the participating parties from reneging. Our theory provides a microfoundation to justify the borrowing constraints that are widely used in the existing macroeconomic models. Using the model, we explain the payment puzzle. We also show that some assets are more suitable as collateral than others with different physical properties, for example, storable asset versus durable asset.