Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data
利用佛罗里达州行政数据，研究失业保险税上调对企业雇佣和就业的影响，发现税收增加显著减少雇佣和就业，对裁员和工资无影响，并解释了经济衰退后12%的失业。
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.