Government Bailout Funds: Balancing Rules and Discretion
研究了在多家企业经济失败威胁稳定时，政府如何设计救助方案，通过设定救助基金上限来平衡灵活应对未来情况与抑制企业道德风险。
Abstract This paper studies government bailout design in the face of economic failures by multiple firms, with ensuing threats to economic stability. Assuming that a commitment to a bailout magnitude is possible, yet cannot be made contingent on unforeseen circumstances, it is argued that the optimal policy consists of stipulating a bailout fund whose upper limit cannot be exceeded. Such an equilibrium policy provides a balance between flexibility to adjust to future circumstances and restraint of moral hazard incentive faced by the firms. An extension to the baseline model considers the case where corporate interests, divergent from those of the public, play a role, and the cap on bailout spending matters for the bargaining outcome between those interests.