Entrenchment or efficiency? CEO‐to‐employee pay ratio and the cost of debt
利用Dodd-Frank法案强制披露的CEO与员工薪酬比数据，研究发现该比率与债券利差负相关，支持薪酬差距的激励效应而非寻租解释，对财务受限、劳动密集和中小企业尤其显著。
Abstract Using new data on S&P 1500 firms’ chief executive officer (CEO)‐to‐employee pay ratios disclosed by mandate of Section 953(b) of the Dodd–Frank Act, we examine the effect of within‐firm pay inequality on bond yield spreads. We find a significant negative relation between industry‐adjusted CEO‐to‐employee pay ratio and yield spreads while controlling for covariates and endogeneity. This result is strongest in financially constrained, labor‐intensive, and small‐to‐medium‐sized firms. The evidence supports the incentive‐provision explanation of CEO‐to‐employee pay disparity, reflecting efficient CEO compensation rather than rent extraction. We also document selection bias in self‐reported pay ratios, highlighting the efficacy of the Dodd–Frank provisions.