Kicking the Can Down the Road: Government Interventions in the European Banking Sector
研究了2008-2009年金融危机期间欧元区银行部门的政府干预，发现财政受限的政府通过提供担保而非全面资本重组来拖延问题，导致银行转向风险主权债务和僵尸贷款，削弱信贷供给并增加风险。
Abstract We analyze government interventions in the eurozone banking sector during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Using a novel data set, we document that fiscally constrained governments “kicked the can down the road” by providing banks with guarantees instead of fully-fledged recapitalizations. We econometrically address the endogeneity associated with bailout decisions in identifying their consequences. We find that forbearance prompted undercapitalized banks to shift their assets from loans to risky sovereign debt and engage in zombie lending, resulting in weaker credit supply, elevated risk in the banking sector, and, eventually, a greater reliance on liquidity support from the European Central Bank.