Monitoring in Originate-to-Distribute Lending: Reputation versus Skin in the Game
研究了银行在发起分销贷款模式下，声誉机制如何替代风险共担来激励银行监督贷款质量，并发现贷款需求激增的繁荣期会削弱监督，尤其是对低声誉银行。
Abstract Banks face liquidity and capital pressures that favor selling off the loans they originate, but loan sales undermine their monitoring incentives. A bank’s loan default history is a noisy measure of its past monitoring choices, which can serve as a reputation mechanism to incentivize current monitoring. In equilibrium, higher reputation banks monitor (weakly) more intensively; if retention is credible, they generally retain less of the loans they originate. Monitoring is difficult to sustain in periods with uncommonly large spikes in loan demand (“booms”), especially for low-reputation banks, which are more likely to accommodate boom demand and forgo monitoring.