Information versus Investment
研究了企业信息披露与长期投资效率之间的权衡，通过动态均衡模型量化了盈余误报对投资扭曲和公司价值的影响，发现最优披露监管水平高于当前估计值。
Abstract We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm managers confront realistic incentives to misreport earnings and distort their real investment choices. The model implies a socially optimal level of disclosure regulation that exceeds the estimated value. Counterfactual analysis reveals that eliminating earnings misreporting completely through disclosure regulation incentivizes managers to distort real investment. Lower earnings informativeness raises the cost of capital, which results in a 5.7$\%$ drop in average firm value, but more modest effects on social welfare and aggregate growth. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.