Is “accredited crowdfunding” a lemons market? Evidence from 506(c) filings
研究美国JOBS法案后允许小公司向认证投资者广告销售证券是否会导致柠檬市场，结果发现不存在柠檬市场，高质量公司通过运营特征和风投监督发出有效信号。
The United States Congress passed the JOBS Act of 2012, which allowed small private companies to advertise the sale of their securities to accredited investors. However, this new fundraising method is subject to criticism that it might lead to a lemons market in crowdfunding platforms due to limited information disclosure requirements. This article thus examines this concern, and the results do not support the development of a lemons market. Conversely, we identify a separating equilibrium in which quality companies choose to raise capital from the accredited investors. Firms’ operating characteristics and VC monitoring provide effective signals in the accredited crowdfunding markets.