Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
研究在双方争夺不安全产出的模型中，无武装的和平协议与可能具有破坏性的战争之间的选择，发现和平能否出现取决于战争破坏性、产出安全度和初始资源分配，且事前资源转移可在特定条件下改善和平前景。
On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, ex ante resource transfers without commitments can improve the prospects for peace, but only when the configuration of parameters describing the degree of output security and the degree of war's destruction ensures the possibility of peace without such transfers at least for some sufficiently even initial resource distributions.