Debt Maturity and the Dynamics of Leverage
研究了短期债务如何迫使股东在低盈利状态下减少杠杆，但也会增加交易成本，并分析了这一权衡如何决定最优债务期限结构。
Abstract This paper shows that short debt maturities commit equityholders to leverage reductions when refinancing expiring debt in low-profitability states. However, shorter maturities lead to higher transaction costs since larger amounts of expiring debt need to be refinanced. We show that this trade-off between higher expected transaction costs against the commitment to reduce leverage in low-profitability states motivates an optimal maturity structure of corporate debt. Since firms with high costs of financial distress and risky cash flows benefit most from committing to leverage reductions, they have a stronger motive to issue short-term debt. Evidence supports the model’s predictions.