Short‐termism, shareholder payouts and investment in the EU
研究了投资者驱动的短期主义是否损害欧盟上市公司长期投资能力，发现净股东支付温和、投资和现金余额增加，数据不支持因此进行公司治理改革。
Abstract Investor‐driven 'short‐termism' is said to harm EU public firms' ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered—rising levels of repurchases and dividends—is incomplete and misleading: it ignores large offsetting equity issuances that move capital from investors to EU firms. We show that, over the last 30 years and the last decade, net shareholder payouts have been moderate and investment and cash balances have increased. In sum, the data provide little basis for the view that short‐termism in the EU warrants corporate governance reforms.